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STREETLIFE AND RESIDENTIAL BREAK-INS. Northeastern University
Press 1994. 231 pp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The roots of rational choice theory trace back to the classical
school of criminology and to the work of great eighteenth and nine-
teenth century philosophers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham.'
Both men were mainly interested in the control of crime through the
manipulation of penal sanctions rather than the direct observations of
criminals or the analysis of aggregate crime data. Firm adherents to
the free will philosophy that was fashionable in Enlightenment Eu-
rope, they believed that man could determine his own destiny by the
use of reason and knowledge. These early criminal law and penal re-
formers defined crime in legal terms and regarded the offender as
morally guilty because he had freely chosen to commit a criminal act.
2
* Professor of Sociology, Mount Holyoke College.
1 Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), who published his epoch-breaking Dei delitti e dellepene
in July of 1764, believed that humans are by nature self-seeking and motivated to gain all
they can from one another. If society is to endure, a system of punishment is necessary to
keep people from breaking the rules. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the father of Utilitari-
anism, was an eccentric character dedicated to practical affairs. His ethical principal was
the greatest good for the greatest number. He believed that all men were motivated by the
pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The function of the criminal law was to
prevent crime by adjusting penal sanctions sufficiently to discourage the commission of
deliberate unlawful acts. For an article discussing the contribution of Beccaria and Ben-
tham to the classical school of criminology, see Elio Monachesi, Cesare Beccaria in PIONEE-S
IN CRIMINOLOGY 36 (Hermann Mannheim ed., 2d ed. 1972); Gilbert Geis,Jeremy Bentham in
PIONEERS IN CRIMINOLOGY 51 (Hermann Mannheim ed., 2d ed. 1972).
2 Baron Raffiele Garofalo (1852-1934) was among the first to recognize the limitations
of a purely legal definition of crime. His search for the "natural crime," an act considered
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Today, more than two hundred years later, the main tenets of
classical ideas on crime and punishment have been dug-up, melted
down, and recycled for a modem audience. Rational choice theory,
which is really not a theory but merely a research methodology or
perspective, seeks to restore the central operating assumption of class-
ical criminology: criminals are rational and, much like the rest of us,
consider the likely consequences of their behavior before deciding on
a course of action. An interesting if painfully obvious insight to be
sure, but one for which there is at best mixed empirical evidence.3
II. BACK TO THE FUTURE
In the late 1960s, a future Nobel Prize winner in economics, Gary
Becker, ignoring with apparent glee the long tradition in economics
of linking crime with capitalism and changing economic conditions,
proposed an artless cost-benefit analysis of criminal behavior as the
basis for the allocation of scarce resources in law enforcement. 4 Ed-
ward Banfield, an urban policy analyst, boldly asserted that "when the
probable costs exceed probable benefits, an individual will not com-
mit the crime."5 James Q. Wilson, a political scientist, advocated a
similar approach, complaining that the "root cause" explanations fa-
vored by sociologists, psychologists, and social reformers had failed to
lead to useful modes of intervention. 6 He proposed an abandonment
of the last 100 years of criminological research and the adoption of a
classical punishment/deterrence model.7 The central goal of his new
policy-driven criminology was raising the cost of crime and lowering
its benefits. 8 The fact that this binary system of criminal motivation
had all the intellectual sophistication of a game of tic-tac-toe seemed
to enhance rather than diminish its appeal.
To policy makers and funding agencies desperate to do some-
thing about crime, the proposition of putting more criminals in jail
for longer periods of time to reduce the crime rate seemed simple
enough.9 Today, after almost twenty-five years of steady growth in the
criminal in all societies under all circumstances throughout history, led him to argue for a
sociological definition of crime. See BARON RAFFAELE GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY (1968).
3 Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory: The Path Not
Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (1990).
4 In economics this is called the "expected utility" principle. See Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
5 EDWARD C. BANFiELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY 160 (1968).
6 JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975).
7 Id.
8 See id. at 55-56.
9 TREVOR BENNETT & RICHARD WRIGHT, BURGLARS ON BURGLARY' PREVENTION AND THE
OFFENDER (1984). Bennett and Wright speculate on the difficulty in England of raising
offenders' opportunities as a way of altering the cost-benefits deliberation. Offenders sim-
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jail and prison population, from .3 million in 1970 to 1.5 million to-
day, the crime rate is finally beginning to decline.10 Is this a long
awaited validation of our policy of raising the costs of crime through
massive imprisonment, as rational choice advocates might claim, or
merely the result of demographic or social changes?
However, a closer look at this policy of massive imprisonment
reveals that violent crime has remained steady or risen slightly even as
rates of imprisonment have soared. The experience of California and
Texas is instructive. During the 1980s, California's prison population
increased by 192%, while Texas' increased by only 14%. By the end of
the decade, however, both states had experienced a 21% increase in
violent crime. After spending nearly three billion dollars to build and
operate prisons, California has little to show for its expenditures, ex-
cept a modest reduction in property offenses."
If increasing the cost of crime has had any effect, it appears to be
limited to property crimes, mostly a drop in burglary rates. Burglars
On The Job provides a detailed explanation of the limits of rational
choice theory as a basis of public policy.12 The book suggests that the
slight drop in burglary is more likely due to an incapacitation effect or
a switch among burglars to armed robbery than it is to a recalculation
by street criminals of the costs and benefits of crime.
III. STUDYING ACTrVE BURGLARS
For criminologists accustomed to pouring over statistical abstracts
or manipulating data on a computer screen, Burglars on the Job comes
as a welcome relief. Theories of crime arise out of other theories or
computer-generated statistical models, each time getting further and
further away from actual subjects. Field research helps reintroduce
criminologists to the criminal, reminding them of the critical impor-
tance of the offender's perspective in the study and control of crime.
In this remarkable book, Richard Wright and Scott Decker provide a
clear and penetrating peek into the lives and crimes of street
criminals, a glimpse into the real world of crime.
13
There is very little quality street ethnography conducted today.
ply require too much money to meet their life-style needs to make this approach feasible.
The same undoubtedly holds true here in America.
10 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).
11 Campaign For An Effective Crime Policy, What Every Policymaker Should Know About
Imprisonment and the Cime Rate, PUB. PoL'Y REP., February 1995; ALBERTJ. REISS, JR. &JEF-
FREY A. ROTH, UNDERSrANDING AND PRvENTING VIOLENCE 79-80 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. &Jef-
frey A. Roth eds 1993).





Many criminologists consider it too dangerous, expensive, and time
consuming. Others believe that active criminals would not talk with
researchers, much less share with them the tricks of the trade. The
authors have proven the latter myth. On the contrary, once assured of
confidentiality, most burglars welcomed the opportunity to speak with
professional researchers about their skills, strategies, and achieve-
ments in the world of crime. 14 Also, the chance to appear in a book, if
only anonymously, was a powerful acknowledgment of their compe-
tence as burglars.
Burglars on the Job permits the reader to understand how street
criminals think, not only about crime but how they approach life.
Good street ethnography affords a view of decision-making in the day-
to-day lives of offenders. More importantly, it unravels the complex
connection between their lives on the street and the crimes they com-
mit in a way that no statistical study or armchair theory could capture.
The offenders in Wright and Decker's book are residential bur-
glars who refer to themselves as "hustlers," always on the lookout for
the chance to make a buck. This is a meaningful distinction because
if given the opportunity, nearly all burglars commit other crimes. The
book is distinct in criminological research in that it reports on active
burglars, people still on the streets engaged in episodic burglaries,
and not convicted criminals behind prison bars.
Most research on burglars has focused on prison inmates. Such
research is problematic because not only are the burglars failed
criminals, but their incarceration may affect what they say. No matter
what the assurances, all inmates think that what is said to an inter-
viewer will somehow get back to prison officials and perhaps influence
their chances for parole. For example, almost all inmates tell inter-
viewers that they have learned their lesson and that they plan to go
straight upon release, although some have continued to commit
crimes while behind bars. Retrospective interpretation may also dis-
tort the inmate's statements; looking back, the inmate constructs a
different perspective of his behavior than when he was on the outside
and committing crimes.'
5
By studying residential burglars in their natural setting, Wright
and Decker are able to explore the limits of rational choice theory.
Criminals do make choices, but those choices are bound by emotions,
culture, and mitigated by routine. Deciding to commit a crime is not
14 Many of the burglars were suspicious of the researchers, fearing that they were a
front for a sting operation. Active criminals are often caught by police because they have
talked about their crimes on the streets. Initially, these active and therefore successful
burglars had a natural reluctance to talk.
15 See EDWIN M. SCHUR, LABELIING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 52-56 (1971).
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the same thing as selecting which box of breakfast cereal to purchase,
or where to go for lunch, even if these decisions share many of the
same characteristics.
The authors conducted field research for eighteen months in St.
Louis, Missouri, from 1989 to 1991. They employed two research
sites: a predominantly black neighborhood, and a neighborhood in-
habited by mostly poor whites. Both sites can be characterized as
inner-city neighborhoods with a robust streetlife. 16
Snowball sampling helped locate active burglars. Although diffi-
cult at first, the authors were able to hire an ex-offender, "Street
Daddy," to recruit subjects. Street Daddy is a wheelchair-bound for-
mer thief who retains a solid street reputation. Through a referral
system, and the promise of a-$25.00 payment,17 Street Daddy provided
the authors with 105 active burglars, 75% of whom had never been
convicted of burglary. Two-thirds of the sample averaged ten or fewer
burglaries a year, while 7% averaged fifty or more burglaries per
year.' 8 The subjects included eighty-seven males and eighteen fe-
males. The inclusion of females is unusual, especially for this kind of
research.
IV. THE DECISION TO COMMIT A BURGLARY
In the last fifteen years, rational choice theory has been the domi-
nant explanation for residential burglary. Rational choice theorists
focus exclusively on the objective characteristics of the immediate
criminal situation, and leave little or no room for the role of subjec-
tive influences such as emotions. For Wright and Decker, the ques-
tion is "[H]ow and why mental states are related to the pursuit of
material gain so that a crime results. [While not entirely rejecting ra-
tional choice theory, the authors ] ... contend that this cannot be
done adequately without examining the part played by cultural forces
in motivating the decision to commit an offense."19
According to Wright and Decker, the rational nature of a deci-
sion to commit a burglary is limited by the masculine ideals of inde-
16 The predominantly black neighborhood is in North St. Louis. The mostly white
neighborhood is in South St. Louis. For those familiar with St. Louis, Fairgrounds Park and
Fox/Benton were among the neighborhoods studied.
17 Several subjects assisted the authors in locating other active burglars by "pimping"
compatriots, introducing them to researchers for a cut of the participation fee, generally
$10.00.
18 See MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972); PAUL E.
TRACY Er AL., DELINQUENCY IN Two BIRTH CoHomRs (1985); LYLE W. SHANNON ET AL., CRIMI-
NAL CAREER CONINUr. ITs SociAL CONTEXT (1988).




pendence and self-reliance, as well as by the value street culture places
on spontaneity. Most offenders simply refuse to consider legitimate
means to obtain money. Street culture places intense pressure on of-
fenders to act quickly lest their reputations as successful hustlers be
jeopardized.20 Within the context of street culture the criminal has
no other "rational" choice but to consider the possibility of commit-
ting a residential burglary.
For theoretical guidance, Wright and Decker turn to the largely
overlooked work of John Lofland.21 In Deviance and Identity, Lofland
stated that the decision to commit a crime is usually the result of a
three phase process. 22 According to Lofland, the possibility of physi-
cal harm or the risk of social disgrace creates a perceived threat which
is experienced within a sociocultural context.2 3 The individual then
moves to a state of "psychosocial encapsulation" where the perceived
risks become diminished.24 Finally a criminal act is committed.2 5
The St. Louis burglars closely followed the Lofland developmen-
tal sequence. Almost all of them began to think about a burglary
under intense emotional pressure to obtain money quickly. Indeed,
the number of times they committed burglaries during a given period
depended upon how often they needed money. The financial pres-
sure they felt was not to pay the rent or purchase food, but the desper-
ate need for cash to keep up with street culture. Those with cash in
their pockets had respect; those who were broke were called "scum
bums" and excluded from street action. Thus, the lack of money to
buy drugs and "keep the party going" was a serious threat to a per-
son's social standing on the street.
Much of street life is oriented to getting and staying high. To-
ward this end offenders need a good deal of ready cash. A regularjob
could not satisfy the need for this much cash. For example, seventeen
of ninety-five subjects were regularly employed. A number disdained
work because they hated routine and because work interfered with
their lifestyle. Their first goal was "keeping the party going," which
meant taking drugs or procuring sex from prostitutes whom they
called "ducks." To be regarded as hip, subjects needed to "keep up
appearances." Fancy clothes and expensive cars were the items most
often mentioned as status symbols, but drugs and sex were also impor-
tant. Wright and Decker emphasize that it is the "living for the mo-
20 Id. at 202.
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ment" aspect of street culture, not true financial hardship, that
motivates people to commit burglaries. In this environment, regular
work is not a practical alternative.
Seven of the burglars said they committed burglaries primarily
for the thrill of it rather than the money. Committing crimes made
them feel like somebody and raised their self-esteem. In addition, the
fun and challenge of crime was important. Many of the subjects re-
ported they felt better about themselves after committing the burgla-
ries. Freud called these people "criminals from a sense a guilt" and
observed that the commission of a crime seemed to relieve feelings of
guilt rather than produce them.2 6 This theory, if correct, helps ex-
plain why most criminals appear immune to the threat of punishment,
and seriously undermines the foundation of deterrence theory.
A. SELECTING A TARGET
Burglars choose a target in one of three ways. Usually they know
the occupants; researchers have long observed that most crimes of vio-
lence are committed by people known to the victim.2 7 This remains
true today despite the FBI's recent claim to the contrary.28 One of the
remarkable findings to emerge from this study is the fact that many of
the victims of residential burglary are acquainted with the offender.
Wright and Decker estimate that this figure may well be more than
fifty percent. While only a few of Wright and Decker's burglars se-
lected homes belonging to close friends or relatives, most burglarized
homes of people with whom they were acquainted.
Not surprisingly, the homes of drug dealers were a favorite target.
The burglars knew the dealers' daily schedules; most lived alone, and
spent day and night on the streets. Burglars also knew that they would
be likely to find large amounts of money or drugs on the premises,
allowing burglars to kill "two birds with one stone," since illegal drugs
could be obtained directly. Furthermore, drug dealers are not likely
to report their victimization to the police.
Employed burglars had a decisive advantage in locating potential
targets. Those employed as repair or installation men were often left
unsupervised in the victim's home, as were cable television and deliv-
26 SIGMUND FREUD, CRIMINALS FROM A SENSE OF GUILT (1876); SIGMUND FREUD: THE
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LFE (1965).
27 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 287 (1994).
28 InJanuary of 1995, the FBI put out a press release claiming that 53% of all homicides
were committed by strangers, and that for the first time, all Americans have a realistic
chance of being murdered. They arrived at this figure by lumping "unsolved" homicides
with homicides committed by strangers. Thus they created the impression that homicide
had become increasingly random.
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ery men. Gardeners and cleaning people also had good opportuni-
ties, not only to case the house for valuables, but also to learn the
routine of the occupants. Unemployed burglars often posed as door-
to-door salesman, or even burglar alarm serviceman, which gave them
an opportunity to learn about existing security systems.
Other burglars relied on tips from informants. Tipsters regularly
passed on knowledge for a piece of the action. This reduced the risk
of detection and increased the rewards of burglary. For example, air-
port clerks passed on information about the travel plans of local fami-
lies, insurance agents told which houses had insured valuables,
gardeners or maids told of the location of valuables as well as the
schedules of the occupants. Some burglars avoided tipsters alto-
gether, fearing a set up. Wright and Decker report that the "code of
honor" among thieves has entirely broken down. To the St. Louis
burglar, everyone was fair game, even friends, relatives, and other
thieves.
Some offenders chose targets by watching a dwelling over time,
enabling them to learn the occupant's routine. Also, the appearance
of the residence gave cues as to the valuables inside. In general, bur-
glars assumed the bigger and better houses contained the most valu-
ables. Expensive cars, especially BMWs and Mercedes-Benzes,
thought to be popular among drug dealers, were seen as positive in-
dicators. These dwellings were often described as "asking to be
burglarized." 2
9
Most burglars chose a neighborhood they knew. This familiarity
gave them a better feel for the people and place, and a sense of secur-
ity. Feeling they must blend in, blacks tended to burglarize homes
occupied by blacks, whites those occupied by whites. This is especially
true for whites, who seldom enter black neighborhoods. Interestingly
enough, both races thought there was a greater police presence and
therefore a greater chance of getting caught in the other's neighbor-
hood.30 In an ironic twist, one burglar switched to robberies when
police stepped up patrols because he believed it was easier to tell
where the police were when doing a robbery on the street. "When
you're comin' out of that window, you never know who's waitin' on
the other side."31
"Neighborhood Watch" signs failed to discourage most offenders
because many of the offensers knew these neighborhoods and were
29 Id. at 84.
30 This may help explain why burglary rates are highest in St. Louis' racially integrated
neighborhoods; all potential burglars, regardless of race, view these areas as suitable places
to commit burglaries.
31 WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 12, at 92.
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not threatened by the signs. Neither decals warning of burglar alarms
nor door locks were much use. By the time a burglar reached the
front door, he was committed to the crime. Indeed, to some burglars,
alarms and elaborate locks indicated there was something inside
worth stealing.
Visibility was also an important consideration. Burglars did not
want to be observed breaking into homes, and generally preferred
points of entry hidden from the street. They also did not want to be
heard. Security bars and storm windows did deter burglars; these
homes simply required too much work for the burglar to gain entry,
especially when there were easier pickings. Very few burglaries could
be described as opportunistic. Not a single offense was prompted by
the chance discovery of an open window or unlocked door. In addi-
tion, tricks to create the illusion that someone was home were ineffec-
tive: radios or televisions blaring did not deter a break-in.
B. ENTERING A HOUSEHOLD
Most burglars simply swallowed their anxiety.3 2 Others used
drugs or alcohol to embolden themselves, contrary to a large body of
drug-crime research suggesting that addicts commit crimes to get
money for drugs.33
Many of burglars approached a residence in the guise of work-
men. Masquerading as carpenters, house painters, service techni-
cians, or delivery men were commonly employed ruses. One female
offender took her young children along, reasoning that a woman with
children would not attract undue suspicion. Most burglars wore dark,
nondescript clothing and affected a calm outWard appearance so as
not to attract attention.
Ninety percent of the burglars always avoided occupied resi-
dences, not out of a concern for the safety of the occupants (most
were willing to use violence if necessary), but because occupied dwell-
ings were considered high risk. Many burglars knew the occupants
and therefore, wanted to make sure they were not recognized. They
checked for occupancy by ringing door bells, knocking on doors, or
calling on the telephone. If someone answered the door, they usually
pretended they were searching for a friend's house but had the wrong
address.
The use of the telephone was particularly ingenious. In cases
32 Id. at 128-29.
33 SeeJoHN C. BALL & M. DOUGLAS ANGLIN, PROBING THE LINics BETWEEN DRUGS AND
CRIME (1989); George Speckart & M. Douglas Anglin, Narcot id Use and Crime: An Ovenvew
of Rec t Research Advances, 18 CoNTEMP. DRUG PRoBs. 741 (Winter 1988).
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where they did not know the occupants, burglars got the household's
name from the mailbox, looked up the telephone number, and called
from a nearby phone booth to see if the occupants were home. If no
one answered, they would leave the telephone off the hook. This way
when they arrived at the residence, a ringing telephone would assure
them that no one was home. Some even called the occupants at work,
thereby assuring themselves that potential trouble was many miles
away.
Each burglar had his or her own technique. One woman picked
up a man at a bar, went back to his house for sex, cased the place
while the man slept, and then returned a few weeks later with her
boyfriend to burglarize the place. Two women teamed up as prosti-
tutes, advertising themselves as two-for-the-price-of-one. Once inside a
man's apartment, typically an elderly man, one woman would ransack
the place while the other had sex with the man.
The fear of getting caught did not deter these burglars. Most
believed in fate; whether they got caught was out of their control. Nor
did pangs of conscience discourage them. Most offenders had no
need to neutralize feelings of guilt before committing a burglary.
Some even persisted in the belief that many of the victims welcomed
the thefts as a chance to replace old equipment.
Burglars defended their crimes on moral grounds. All acknowl-
edged that burglary was wrong. Some even said that they felt guilty
about committing crimes. However, they typically dismissed these
moral qualms by saying that they needed the money. As one burglar
explained: "I mean I feel guilty about [the burglary] ... but you gotta
do what you gotta do to survive."3 Here we can see how the mythol-
ogy of "survival" helps tojustifyr crime. As Wright and Decker continu-
ally remind us, these men and woman were not stealing bread to feed
their families, but guns, cash, and merchandise to obtain drugs to
"keep the party going."
C. SEARCHING THE PREMISES
Once inside, most burglars checked to make sure no one was at
home. They generally experienced the "burglar's high," a feeling of
being a "kid in a candy store."3 5 The high was usually followed by
calm, the anxiety over detection practically disappeared. This calm
allowed the burglar to search the residence while remaining mentally
alert. Depending on the individual offender's tolerance for risk, he
either conducted a quick or a leisurely search.
34 WRIGHT & DECKER, supra note 12, at 136.
35 Id. at 140-41.
1156 [Vol. 86
1996] RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY BACK TO REALITY
The burglars in Wright and Decker's study realized that the
longer they remained in a residence, the greater the risk of discovery.
Most elected to do a brief search, believing they could quickly locate
enough valuables to make the break-in worthwhile. The master bed-
room was usually the first place hit. Through experience, burglars
knew that they could often find expensive and easy to carry valuables
in the master bedroom. Burglars were primarily looking for money,
jewelry, and firearms. Initially, burglars searched the bedroom
dresser, often emptying the drawers onto the bed. Then they
searched the bedside table, the most likely location for handguns. If
the occupant was poor or elderly, they looked under the mattress.
Shoe boxes in the bedroom closet were another favorite place for bur-
glars to check.
Some of the burglars quit after searching the bedroom, prefer-
ring a quick exit. Most, however, headed for the kitchen, not in
search of appliances, but of money and jewelry. Burglars were aware
that many people like to keep cash stuffed in the freezer or jewelry in
a mayonnaise jar in the refrigerator. The bathroom and medicine
cabinet were then hit, mostly in the search of drugs and cash. Bur-
glars generally skipped the children's room, believing very little of
value was stored there. The last room searched was the living room.
Many burglars shunned large appliances like televisions, videocassette
recorders, and stereos because of the risk of being seen leaving the
premises with large bulky objects in hand.
Most of the St. Louis burglars preferred to work in groups.
Although this reduced the individual's take, it also reduced the
chance of detection and arrest. One burglar acted as a look-out while
the other ransacked the residence. If they were spotted by police,
they could run in different directions assuring that at least one of
them would get away. Interestingly, all the burglars thought they
would be the ones to escape. A few burglars preferred to work alone,
believing most of their partners were not dependable. If caught, most
believed they would probably rat on each other.
About seven percent of the burglars preferred to search the
premises at a leisurely pace. These burglars knew the schedule of the
occupants, and when they were likely to return home. Wright and
Decker interpreted this behavior not only as ensuring the burglars got
everything of value, but, more tellingly, as taking total control of the
victim's living space. "Like teenagers left alone for the weekend by
their parents, most simply helped themselves to whatever alcohol or




And some did urinate or defecate inside the house. Most used
the toilet, but did not flush because of the noise. A few did relieve
themselves on the floor or carpet, claiming they did not want to get
trapped with their pants down in the bathroom. Finally, on the way
out, most experienced "euphoria" that they had pulled it off.
D. DISPOSING OF THE GOODS
Once the burglary was successfully completed, offenders began to
think about turning the stolen goods into cash. There were, of
course, risks in selling "hot" property. Some potential customers did
not buy goods if they knew the goods were stolen, while others refused
to pay but a small fraction of their value. Unlike a professional fence,
the burglar usually attempted to make his goods appear legitimate.
Since the burglaries were motivated out of real or imaginary financial
desperation (usually imaginary), all burglars wanted to turn stolen
goods into cash immediately. Also, they knew that the longer they
kept the goods, the more likely they were to be caught with them.
Burglars disposed of goods in four ways. One way was to use a
professional fence. A professional fence offers many advantages: he is
safe and convenient, and there is little need to hide the fact that the
goods are stolen. Also, both burglars and fences know the "street
price" of goods, typically one-quarter to one-third of retail, and can
forego elaborate negotiation. Most low-level burglars, however, have
no connection with professional fences and have little idea of how to
find one. All St. Louis burglars interviewed desired a regular relation-
ship with a reliable fence.
Pawnshops offered another, riskier avenue of disposal. Police
keep close watch on pawnshops, which in St. Louis are required to
request identification from sellers and to videotape all transactions.
Most of the criminals who used pawnshops had an agreement with
crooked owners to conduct their business off-camera. Those who
lacked such agreements were forced to take their chances and con-
duct business on-camera.
Many burglars exchanged their goods for drugs. This tactic ena-
bled them quickly and safely to obtain drugs without first having to
convert the stolen goods into cash. "Most of the time ... I take the
stuff to the drug man .... That's what I'm gonna do with the money
anyway... ."37 Drug dealers seldom paid the best prices. In St. Louis
as elsewhere, addicts have flooded the market for stolen merchandise,
36 Id. at 168-69.
37 Id. at 182.
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depressing street prices.
The third avenue for disposal of stolen merchandise was friends,
relatives, and acquaintances. These customers knew the goods were
stolen, and some actually had put in standing orders. But burglars
rarely stole merchandise "on demand." Instead they tended "to keep
their eye out." They offered no discounts to friends; friendship only
bought potential customers access to stolen property, not special
prices.
Selling stolen goods to strangers could increase risk, but most
burglars accepted the risk as going with the territory. "Walking the
streets is risky [too]. Gettin' up out your bed in the morning is
risky."38 Burglars, however, did not sell goods in the neighborhoods
from which they were taken, fearing that the owner might become
aware of the burglar's identity. Bars, lounges, and taverns in nearby
neighborhoods were favorite spots to sell stolen merchandise. Clients
of these establishments were known to look favorably on the purchas-
ing of "hot" merchandise, regarding the fact that the goods are stolen
as evidence of a favorable deal.
Some of the burglars kept items they stole, most commonly, fire-
arms andjewelry. On the streets, both bestowed status on the burglar.
Handguns could be used for protection and, of course, to commit
armed robberies. Carrying a gun also enhanced a person's reputation
on the streets as being "ruthless."3 9 Perhaps of equal importance,
both handguns and jewelry could be easily converted to cash when the
need unexpectedly arrived.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Burglars on the Job redirects our thinking about rational choice
perspectives and it raises serious questions about the efficacy of public
policy based on the purely rational, calculating criminal. The book
reminds us that when people (notjust criminals) make choices, those
choices are confined by both emotions and culture. Too often ra-
tional choice proponents have proceeded as if the decision (if it can
rightly be called a decision) to commit a crime takes place in a vac-
uum with the aid of a pocket calculator. Criminals are not cost ac-
countants and it does scholars who study crime little good to proceed
as if they were.
According to Wright and Decker, "[tihough... burglars made
conscious choices throughout their crimes, their offending did not
appear to be an independent, freely chosen event so much as it was
38 Id. at 189.
39 Id. at 192.
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part of a general flow of action emanating from and shaped by their
involvement with street culture. '40 And it is this involvement in street
culture that makes preventing burglary so difficult, for street culture is
what fuels the engine of crime in the inner city.
Although endemic joblessness and persistent poverty undoubt-
edly help create the conditions under which street culture thrives,job
creation would not reform these burglars. "Not only are the majority
of them poorly educated and unskilled, many are unreliable, suffering
from drug and alcohol problems, and resistant to following instruc-
tions or taking orders."41 They are neither willing nor able to take
advantage ofjob opportunities.
At the deepest levels, Wright and Decker's burglars realized that
social forces were aligned against them, that their lives were circum-
scribed yet out of control. They were nobodies and they knew it. But
they still had dreams, and involvement in street culture allowed them
to continue dreaming. They believed the next burglary would solve
all their problems. By living the life style of a hustler, they become
somebody, a "contender" in the eyes of those on the streets.
Nor would the threat of severe punishment deter these burglars.
Most made spur-of-the-moment decisions to offend while under in-
tense emotional pressure to obtain cash quickly. They did not really
plan their burglaries and having escaped apprehension so often, their
perception of risk and the expectation of punishment were extremely
low. 42 Since persistent criminals generally associate with one another,
an arrest for burglary does not "set off" a whole series of informal
costs.
4 3
The policy implications of Burglars on the Job are all too clear:
street culture is the major criminogenic force in the inner city.
Wright and Decker report that once a youth becomes immersed in
street life, with few exceptions, they are lost to that life. The challenge
that lies ahead is to break up this "oppositional culture," and to pre-
vent new recruits from entering its domain. 4
40 Id. at 205.
41 Id. at 207.
42 Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk and Social Controk Do Sanctions Really Deter?,
17 L. & Soc'y REv. 457 (1983).
43 Most researchers believe the informal system of social sanctions is more powerful
than the fear of arrest and imprisonment in deterring crime and delinquency. See FRANmuN
ZrMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE (1973).
44 See ELjIAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY
(1990).
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